Comparison Overview
Midea Italia

Midea Italia
Viale Luigi Bodio, 29/37, Milano, Lombardia, 20158, IT
Last Update: 14/02/2026
Parte di Midea Group, Midea Italia progetta elettrodomestici e soluzioni innovative per la casa, pensate per offrire un comfort senza precedenti. “Portare grandi innovazioni nella vita quotidiana" è la missione del Gruppo e la visione chiara dei suoi fondatori, che ...

TE Connectivity
Galway, IE
Last Update: 23/09/2026
TE Connectivity plc (NYSE: TEL) is a global industrial technology leader creating a safer, sustainable, productive and connected future. As a trusted innovation partner, our broad range of connectivity and sensor solutions enable the distribution of power, signal and da...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Midea Italia







TE Connectivity






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Midea Italia in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TE Connectivity in 2026.
Incident History - Midea Italia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Midea Italia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TE Connectivity (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TE Connectivity cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Midea Italia

TE Connectivity
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.