Comparison Overview
Midea Carrier Argentina

Midea Carrier Argentina
1426, Buenos Aires, AR
Last Update: 01/03/2026
Midea Carrier es el resultado de la unión de dos gigantes mundiales en el mercado: Midea subsidiaria de Midea Group: líder en la producción de electrodomésticos y Aires Acondicionados, y Carrier líder en aire acondicionado y fundada por el inventor del aire acondicionad...

Legrand
128 avenue du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny, Limoges, 87045, FR
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Legrand is a global specialist in electrical and digital building infrastructures, dedicated to supporting technological, societal and environmental change around the globe. Our purpose is to improve lives by transforming the spaces where people live, work and meet by...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Midea Carrier Argentina







Legrand






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Midea Carrier Argentina in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Legrand in 2026.
Incident History - Midea Carrier Argentina (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Midea Carrier Argentina cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Legrand (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Legrand cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Midea Carrier Argentina

Legrand
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.