Comparison Overview
Michigan Department of Natural Resources

Michigan Department of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 30028, Lansing, 48909, US
Last Update: 09/12/2025
The Michigan Department of Natural Resources (DNR) is committed to the conservation, protection, management, use and enjoyment of the state’s natural and cultural resources for current and future generations. For more information about the DNR, please visit www.michigan...

IBGE
Av. Franklin Roosevelt, 166, Rio de Janeiro, 20021-120, BR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics or IBGE (Portuguese: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), is the agency responsible for statistical, geographic, cartographic, geodetic and environmental information in Brazil. The IBGE performs a national...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Michigan Department of Natural Resources







IBGE






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Michigan Department of Natural Resources in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IBGE in 2026.
Incident History - Michigan Department of Natural Resources (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Michigan Department of Natural Resources cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IBGE (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IBGE cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Michigan Department of Natural Resources

IBGE
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.