Comparison Overview
Meghna Group of Industries (MGI)

Meghna Group of Industries (MGI)
MGI Head Office, Fresh Villa. Road 34 House 15, Gulshan-1, 1212, BD
Last Update: 04/04/2026
MGI represents an enterprise and brand with 48 years of national and global experience. It currently operates more than 54 industrial units, houses over 50,000 employees, 6,650 distributors, and 15,000 suppliers under its umbrella, and achieves an annual turnover of app...

Asian Paints
Asian Paints House, 6A Shantinagar, Santacruz (East), Mumbai, Maharashtra, IN, 400055
Last Update: 01/04/2026
They say home is where the heart is. Which is why, since 1942, we’ve been helping customers transform empty properties to homes by dressing them up in warm hues, pastel shades and cool colours, to create spaces that truly represent you. Asian Paints has a lot of identit...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Meghna Group of Industries (MGI)







Asian Paints






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Meghna Group of Industries (MGI) in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Asian Paints in 2026.
Incident History - Meghna Group of Industries (MGI) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Meghna Group of Industries (MGI) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Asian Paints (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Asian Paints cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Meghna Group of Industries (MGI)

Asian Paints
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.