Comparison Overview
MetLife in Italia

MetLife in Italia
Via Andrea Vesalio, 6, Rome, Latium, 00161, IT
Last Update: 20/05/2026
MetLife Inc. è un gruppo mondiale, leader nell’offerta di prodotti assicurativi di risparmio ed Employee Benefits che serve oltre 90 milioni di clienti. Attraverso le sue filiali e società controllate, MetLife è tra i leader di mercato negli Stati Uniti, in Giappone, in...

AXA XL
One Bermudiana Road, Hamilton, Bermuda, BM, HM08
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We are a leading provider of insurance and reinsurance offering innovative risk management solutions for businesses worldwide. We partner with those who move the world forward, navigating complex risks and working across diverse industries to support and empower our cli...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

MetLife in Italia







AXA XL






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MetLife in Italia in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AXA XL in 2026.
Incident History - MetLife in Italia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MetLife in Italia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - AXA XL (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AXA XL cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

MetLife in Italia

AXA XL
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security flaw has been discovered in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function pathinfo of the file /upload_files.php of the component Filename Extension. Performing a manipulation results in unrestricted upload. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /process_lesson.php. Such manipulation of the argument user_id leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was determined in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /paymentdischarge.php. This manipulation of the argument patientid causes sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.
A vulnerability was found in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /payment.php. The manipulation of the argument patientid results in sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator. The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces). On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure. The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").