Comparison Overview
Method Park by UL Solutions

Method Park by UL Solutions
Wetterkreuz 19a, Erlangen, 91058, DE
Last Update: 04/04/2026
This account will soon be archived. Please follow UL Solutions - Software Intensive Systems for more information. Method Park by UL Solutions specializes in software and systems engineering. Our portfolio includes complex, process-based product engineering, software of...

Worley
420 George St, Sydney, 2000, AU
Last Update: 29/03/2026
Worley is a global professional services company of energy, chemicals and resources experts headquartered in Australia. We’re bridging two worlds, accelerating the shift to more sustainable energy sources, while helping our customers provide the energy, chemicals and ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Method Park by UL Solutions







Worley






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Method Park by UL Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Worley in 2026.
Incident History - Method Park by UL Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Method Park by UL Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Worley (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Worley cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Method Park by UL Solutions

Worley
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.