Comparison Overview
metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH

metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH
Leopoldstraße 146, Munich, 80804, DE
Last Update: 31/03/2026
For over 35 years, metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH, a business and IT consulting company, has been at the side of its customers in an increasingly digital and dynamic world. Our promise: We shine a new light on future viability. We enable our customers to find, deve...

Appen
12131 113th Ave NE, Kirkland, 98034, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Appen has been a leader in AI training data for over 25 years, providing high-quality, diverse datasets that power the world's leading AI models. Our end-to-end platform, deep expertise, and scalable human-in-the-loop services enable AI innovators to build and optimize ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH







Appen






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Appen in 2026.
Incident History - metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH (X = Date, Y = Severity)
metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Appen (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Appen cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

metafinanz Informationssysteme GmbH

Appen
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/handler.go sendFile handler opened files using a cleaned path but derived the authorization filename from raw req.URL.Path, so a trailing slash could bypass .goshs ACL-file protection and block-list checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/updown.go multipart upload handler split part.FileName() on / but did not reject .., allowing an unauthenticated upload with filename .. to create a file outside the served tree. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.4, the httpserver/server.go wdGuard handled WebDAV MOVE as a write-only method and did not enforce --no-delete, allowing WebDAV clients to delete or overwrite files via MOVE with Overwrite: T. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. From 2.1.3 until 2.1.4, the sftpserver/sftpserver.go password handler used Username != "" && Password != "", so running goshs with -b 'admin:' -sftp and no -fkf left both SFTP authentication handlers unset and allowed unauthenticated file access. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.