Comparison Overview
Metabolic Maintenance

Metabolic Maintenance
650 S 500 W, Salt Lake City, 84101, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Since 1984 the Metabolic Maintenance family has been steadfast in producing pure, high-quality, preservative-free products with no added excipients, fillers or binders. Our products are manufactured per the highest standards with only the most conscientious sourcing of ...

Forever Living Products (UK) Ltd
GB
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Forever Living Products and its affiliates are the largest growers, manufacturer and distributors of Aloe Vera products. The key to Forever Living's success is commitment to quality and purity. In order to ensure the highest quality, Forever Living cultivates aloe vera ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Metabolic Maintenance







Forever Living Products (UK) Ltd






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wellness and Fitness Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Metabolic Maintenance in 2026.
Incidents vs Wellness and Fitness Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Forever Living Products (UK) Ltd in 2026.
Incident History - Metabolic Maintenance (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Metabolic Maintenance cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Forever Living Products (UK) Ltd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Forever Living Products (UK) Ltd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Metabolic Maintenance

Forever Living Products (UK) Ltd
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.