Comparison Overview
Mercy Virtual
Mercy Virtual
15740 S Outer Forty Rd, Chesterfield, Missouri, 63017, US
Last Update: 22/04/2026
For nearly 200 years, the caregivers of Mercy have provided care where it is needed most. Today, technology allows us to fulfill this mission literally as well as figuratively. Mercy Virtual is transforming health care 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year...
Health Care Service Corporation
300 E Randolph St, Chicago, 60601, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Health Care Service Corporation serves nearly 23 million people across the United States through its portfolio of health benefit solutions. HCSC provides health coverage options for employers large and small, individuals and families, and Medicare and Medicaid plans. H...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Mercy Virtual
Health Care Service Corporation
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mercy Virtual in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Health Care Service Corporation in 2026.
Incident History - Mercy Virtual (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mercy Virtual cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Health Care Service Corporation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Health Care Service Corporation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Mercy Virtual
Health Care Service Corporation
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/handler.go sendFile handler opened files using a cleaned path but derived the authorization filename from raw req.URL.Path, so a trailing slash could bypass .goshs ACL-file protection and block-list checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/updown.go multipart upload handler split part.FileName() on / but did not reject .., allowing an unauthenticated upload with filename .. to create a file outside the served tree. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.4, the httpserver/server.go wdGuard handled WebDAV MOVE as a write-only method and did not enforce --no-delete, allowing WebDAV clients to delete or overwrite files via MOVE with Overwrite: T. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. From 2.1.3 until 2.1.4, the sftpserver/sftpserver.go password handler used Username != "" && Password != "", so running goshs with -b 'admin:' -sftp and no -fkf left both SFTP authentication handlers unset and allowed unauthenticated file access. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.