Comparison Overview
Mercuri Urval Norway

Mercuri Urval Norway
Sjølyst plass 2, Oslo, 0278, NO
Last Update: 04/12/2025
Mercuri Urval Norway, part of Mercuri Urval, a leading Global Consultancy with over 800 professionals operating in 70 offices in 24 countries world wide. We align key people to the strategic needs of our clients. We work with you to identify, develop and acquire the cap...

Advantage Solutions
8001 Forsyth Blvd, Suite 1025, St Louis, Missouri, US, 63105
Last Update: 04/09/2026
At Advantage Solutions, we're the unseen architects behind your everyday purchases. From pantry staples to your online shopping carts, we ensure your favorite goods are always in stock and within reach by connecting manufacturers to the right retailers and teaming up wi...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Mercuri Urval Norway







Advantage Solutions






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mercuri Urval Norway in 2026.
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Advantage Solutions in 2026.
Incident History - Mercuri Urval Norway (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mercuri Urval Norway cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Advantage Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Advantage Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Mercuri Urval Norway

Advantage Solutions
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.