Comparison Overview
MEGA IMAGE - Ahold Delhaize Group

MEGA IMAGE - Ahold Delhaize Group
Bld. Timisoara, nr. 26, Bucuresti, Sector 6, undefined, undefined, RO
Last Update: 01/03/2026
Noi suntem MEGA IMAGE, brandul de supermarket care te inspiră să trăiești așa cum îți place Facem parte din Grupul Ahold Delhaize, retailer internațional ce operează în prezent în Europa, Statele Unite și Asia. În România, suntem unul dintre cele mai mari lanțuri de sup...

Endeavour Group
26 Waterloo St, Sydney, 2010, AU
Last Update: 14/09/2026
At Endeavour Group we exist to bring people together in better, more enjoyable, and more meaningful ways. Because we believe that social communities are thriving communities, built through great experiences and positive, memorable moments. United behind a common purpo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

MEGA IMAGE - Ahold Delhaize Group







Endeavour Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MEGA IMAGE - Ahold Delhaize Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Endeavour Group in 2026.
Incident History - MEGA IMAGE - Ahold Delhaize Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MEGA IMAGE - Ahold Delhaize Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Endeavour Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Endeavour Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

MEGA IMAGE - Ahold Delhaize Group

Endeavour Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.