Comparison Overview
Mediahub Worldwide

Mediahub Worldwide
100 W 33rd St, New York, NY, 10001, US
Last Update: 02/12/2025
Mediahub is one of the three major global media agencies within IPG’s Mediabrands with over 1100 employees worldwide. We are an award-winning agency built for brands who are challenging and disrupting the status quo. Our organization is focused on challenging all facets...

TBWA\Worldwide
220 E 42nd St, New York, 10017, US
Last Update: 13/09/2026
TBWA is The Disruption Company®. We are a Collective of creative minds with an unlimited creative canvas. We create brand platforms that defy convention and compete with culture. Thanks to our trademarked Disruption® methodology, we build the world’s strongest brands. B...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Mediahub Worldwide







TBWA\Worldwide






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mediahub Worldwide in 2026.
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TBWA\Worldwide in 2026.
Incident History - Mediahub Worldwide (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mediahub Worldwide cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TBWA\Worldwide (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TBWA\Worldwide cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Mediahub Worldwide

TBWA\Worldwide
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability was identified in Anil-matcha Open-Generative-AI up to 1.0.11/2.0.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /api/upload-binary of the component S3 Upload. Such manipulation of the argument x-proxy-target-url leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The name of the patch is f013270957f75e439eaf97eb2a93decb32a4543e. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue.
- https://github.com/Anil-matcha/Open-Generative-AI/
- https://github.com/Anil-matcha/Open-Generative-AI/commit/f013270957f75e439eaf97eb2a93decb32a4543e
- https://github.com/Anil-matcha/Open-Generative-AI/issues/310
- https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-90603
- https://vuldb.com/submit/914005
- https://vuldb.com/vuln/403185
- https://vuldb.com/vuln/403185/cti
A vulnerability was determined in Anil-matcha Open-Generative-AI up to 1.0.11/2.0.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function renderHistory of the file ImageStudio.js of the component Studio Components. This manipulation causes cross site scripting. The attack may be initiated remotely. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.
A vulnerability was found in getzep graphiti up to 0.30.2. Affected is an unknown function of the file server/graph_service/main.py of the component REST API. The manipulation results in improper authentication. The attack can be launched remotely. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.
A vulnerability has been found in itsourcecode Sales and Inventory System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /pages/inv_edit1.php. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
The mcumgr SMP settings-management group handlers settings_mgmt_read(), settings_mgmt_write(), and settings_mgmt_delete() in subsys/mgmt/mcumgr/grp/settings_mgmt/src/settings_mgmt.c allocate a key_name buffer (and, for read, a data buffer) via k_malloc() when CONFIG_MCUMGR_GRP_SETTINGS_BUFFER_TYPE_HEAP is enabled, relying on the end: label to k_free() them. When CONFIG_MCUMGR_GRP_SETTINGS_ACCESS_HOOK is also enabled and the application access hook rejects a request by returning status MGMT_CB_ERROR_RC, the handler executed return ret_rc; directly, bypassing end: and leaking the heap allocation on every rejected request. The settings handlers are reachable over the unauthenticated SMP transport (Bluetooth LE, UART, or UDP, depending on product configuration). The access hook is the mechanism applications use to deny unauthorized settings access, and MGMT_CB_ERROR_RC is a common rejection style, so an attacker who can send settings read/write/delete commands that the hook rejects triggers a heap leak on each attempt. Because the leaked memory is never reclaimed until reboot, a sustained stream of rejected requests monotonically exhausts the kernel heap until k_malloc() fails, denying mcumgr service and impacting any other heap consumer on the device — a denial of service. The impact is availability-only; there is no memory corruption or information disclosure. Only configurations that select the heap buffer type, enable the access hook, and register a hook that returns MGMT_CB_ERROR_RC are affected (the default stack buffer type cannot leak).