Comparison Overview
Maytag

Maytag
600 W Main St, Benton Harbor, 49022, US
Last Update: 16/12/2025
For nearly 130 years, the Maytag brand has proven time and again that it’s built to get the job done, no matter what. Through the Great Depression. Through times of war. Through cultural shifts and advances in technology, the Maytag brand endured. Today, it stands as a ...

the LEGO Group
Aastvej 1, Billund, 7190, DK
Last Update: 06/09/2026
We are the LEGO Group, the company behind the world’s most loved LEGO® bricks. Our brand name derived from the two Danish words Leg Godt, which mean “Play Well”. We’ve been sparking imaginations and inspiring the builders of tomorrow since 1932. This is our mission an...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Maytag







the LEGO Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Maytag in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for the LEGO Group in 2026.
Incident History - Maytag (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Maytag cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - the LEGO Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
the LEGO Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Maytag

the LEGO Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.