Comparison Overview
MAW

MAW
Via Pietro Nenni, 18 - 25124, Brescia, Lombardia, 25124, IT
Last Update: 14/12/2025
MAW è un'agenzia per il lavoro italiana presente nel centro- nord Italia. La capacità di aiutare le aziende clienti ad avere successo e i lavoratori a costruire la migliore crescita professionale è perseguita attraverso la focalizzazione locale, la qualità del servizio...

Alight Solutions
320 S Canal St., 50th floor suite 5000, Chicago, IL, US, 60606
Last Update: 09/09/2026
Alight is a leading cloud-based human capital technology and services provider for many of the world’s largest organizations. Through the administration of employee benefits, Alight powers confident health, wealth, leaves and wellbeing decisions for 35 million people an...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

MAW







Alight Solutions






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Human Resources Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MAW in 2026.
Incidents vs Human Resources Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Alight Solutions in 2026.
Incident History - MAW (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MAW cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Alight Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Alight Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

MAW

Alight Solutions
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.