Comparison Overview
Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd

Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd
Padgets Lane, Redditch, Worcestershire, B98 0RT, GB
Last Update: 15/03/2026
Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd is the sole distributor for new Komatsu Construction, Mining and Utility equipment in the United Kingdom. Offering a range of equipment including hydraulic excavators, wheel loaders, dump trucks and bulldozers. Parts, repairs and service, plus used ...

Sulzer
Neuwiesenstrasse 15, Winterthur, 8401, CH
Last Update: 24/09/2026
Sulzer is a global leader in critical applications for core infrastructure and processes for large essential industries around the world. We ensure the security, quality and durability of critical goods and services by supporting energy security, natural resource manage...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd







Sulzer






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd in 2026.
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sulzer in 2026.
Incident History - Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Sulzer (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sulzer cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Marubeni-Komatsu Ltd

Sulzer
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.