Comparison Overview
Mars Snacking

Mars Snacking
1132 W. Blackhawk St., Chicago, 60642, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Mars Snacking is the world’s leading manufacturer of chocolate, chewing gum, mints, and fruity confections. Mars Wrigley employs approximately 34,000 Associates globally and has operations in approximately 90 countries. Headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, USA, Mars Snac...

PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk
Jakarta, 12910, ID
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Over a number of decades PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk has been progressively transformed to become a Total Food Solutions company with operations in all stages of food manufacturing from the production of raw materials and their processing through to consumer products ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Mars Snacking







PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mars Snacking in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk in 2026.
Incident History - Mars Snacking (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mars Snacking cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Mars Snacking

PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.