Comparison Overview
Manningham Council

Manningham Council
699 Doncaster Road, Doncaster, Victoria, 3108, AU
Last Update: 12/03/2026
We are Manningham. At Manningham Council, we deliver over 100 different services to our vibrant and diverse community. We are proud of our unique blend of city and country. We shape positive outcomes for our community by being inclusive and passionate about what we do....

South African Revenue Service (SARS)
Lehae La Sars, Pretoria, 0001, ZA
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Its main functions are to: collect and administer all national taxes, duties and levies; collect revenue that may be imposed under any other legislation, as agreed on between SARS and an organ of state or institution entitled to the revenue; provide protection a...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Manningham Council







South African Revenue Service (SARS)






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Manningham Council in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for South African Revenue Service (SARS) in 2026.
Incident History - Manningham Council (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Manningham Council cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - South African Revenue Service (SARS) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
South African Revenue Service (SARS) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Manningham Council

South African Revenue Service (SARS)
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.