Comparison Overview
Mail My Doc

Mail My Doc
3103 10th St North, Arlington, VA, 22201-2107, US
Last Update: 21/04/2026
Mail My Doc by Click2Mail is the simplest and easiest way to send postal mail using Google Apps. Click2Mail is a leading, cloud-based print-and-mail service that now enables you to securely manage many of your postal mailing needs directly through your Google account. ...

Havas
29/30 Quai de Dion Bouton, Puteaux, FR, 92800
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Founded in 1835 in Paris, Havas is one of the world’s largest global communications groups, with nearly 23,000 people in over 100 countries. With the ambition to help brands unlock Growth, Powered by Desire, Havas brings together creativity, media, technology and produc...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Mail My Doc







Havas






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Mail My Doc in 2026.
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Havas in 2026.
Incident History - Mail My Doc (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Mail My Doc cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Havas (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Havas cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Mail My Doc

Havas
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.