Comparison Overview
Magic FinServ

Magic FinServ
240 W 34th St 36th Floor, New York City, 10119, US
Last Update: 14/01/2026
Magic FinServ is a leading digital technology services company for the Financial services industry. We bring a rare combination of Capital Markets domain knowledge & new-age technology skills in Blockchain & Artificial Intelligence. We offer end to end services to be yo...

RHB Banking Group
Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur, Kuala Lumpur, MY, 50400
Last Update: 02/04/2026
We are a multinational regional financial services provider that is committed to deliver complete solutions to our clients through differentiated segment offerings and an ecosystem that supports simple, fast and seamless customer experience, underpinned by cohesive and ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Magic FinServ







RHB Banking Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Magic FinServ in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for RHB Banking Group in 2026.
Incident History - Magic FinServ (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Magic FinServ cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - RHB Banking Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
RHB Banking Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Magic FinServ

RHB Banking Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Deserialization of untrusted data in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection. When the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds). Even below the overflow threshold, one connection's net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection's reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer's data into another's parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption. The fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buffer. Affects Zephyr releases shipping the Broadcast Assistant with the shared buffer, including v4.4.0 and earlier.
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-26 contains a memory leak vulnerability in the VIFF encoder when memory allocation fails. Attackers can trigger allocation failures by processing specially crafted VIFF images to exhaust available memory and cause denial of service.
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-26 contains a use-after-free vulnerability in the FormatMagickCaption method when memory allocation fails. Attackers can trigger memory allocation failures to cause a dangling pointer to reference freed memory, potentially enabling denial of service or code execution.
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-26 contains a policy bypass vulnerability in the APNG encoder and external delegates due to missing validation checks. Attackers can write files to disallowed paths by bypassing configured policy restrictions through the APNG encoding process.