Comparison Overview
Magellan Aviation Group

Magellan Aviation Group
2345 B Township Road, Charlotte, NORTH CAROLINA, 28211, US
Last Update: 25/04/2026
Operating out of Charlotte, North Carolina, and Shannon, Ireland, and with satellite offices located all over the world, Magellan Aviation Group is a leading global supplier of aftermarket aircraft products and services and a specialist in engine leasing and trading. We...

Qantas
10 Bourke Road, Mascot, 2020, AU
Last Update: 19/06/2026
We would like to acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of the local lands and waterways on which we live, work and fly. We pay our respects to Elders past and present. Spirit is everything to us, and joining the Qantas team means bringing your spirit to ours. We have...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Magellan Aviation Group







Qantas






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Magellan Aviation Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Qantas in 2026.
Incident History - Magellan Aviation Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Magellan Aviation Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Qantas (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Qantas cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Magellan Aviation Group

Qantas
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.