AMM
Company Details
Linkedin ID:
maersk-group
Website:
Employees number:
79,448
Number of followers:
2,242,896
NAICS:
47
Industry Type:
Homepage:
maersk.com
IP Addresses:
232
Company ID:
A.P_1351900
Scan Status:
Completed
A.P. Moller - Maersk Company CyberSecurity Posture
maersk.com
A.P. Moller - Maersk is an integrated transport and logistics company; going all the way, together, for our customers and society. ALL THE WAY is our commitment to connect the world so that everyone has both the possibility and the ability to trade, grow and thrive. The company employs roughly 110.000 employees across operations in 130 countries.
A.P. Moller - Maersk A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
AMM Risk Score (AI oriented)Between 800 and 849
AMM
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AMM Global Score (TPRM)XXXX
AMM
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AMM Company CyberSecurity News & History
Past Incidents
1
Attack Types
1
Maersk
Cyber Attack
Rankiteo Explanation
Attack threatening the organization’s existence
Description: In 2017, Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company, fell victim to the **NotPetya cyberattack**, a destructive malware campaign attributed to Russian military hackers. The attack originated from a compromised update in Ukrainian accounting software, rapidly spreading across Maersk’s global network. The incident forced the **shutdown of 76 port terminals**, disrupted **over 45,000 PCs and 4,000 servers**, and paralyzed critical operations, including cargo tracking, booking systems, and communication channels.The financial and operational impact was severe, with Maersk estimating losses between **$250–$300 million** due to halted shipments, delayed deliveries, and recovery efforts. The attack exposed deep vulnerabilities in the company’s IT infrastructure, particularly its reliance on interconnected systems without adequate segmentation. While Maersk managed to restore operations within weeks by reinstalling entire systems from backups, the incident highlighted the maritime sector’s susceptibility to **state-sponsored cyber warfare** and the cascading effects of a single breach on global trade.The attack also triggered industry-wide alarm, prompting Maersk and other shipping giants to invest heavily in cybersecurity upgrades, including network isolation, endpoint protection, and employee training to mitigate future threats.
AMM Company Scoring based on AI Models
Cyber Incidents Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
A.I Risk Score Likelihood 3 - 6 - 9 months
Underwriter Stats for AMM
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Average (This Year)
No incidents recorded for A.P. Moller - Maersk in 2025.
Incidents vs All-Companies Average (This Year)
No incidents recorded for A.P. Moller - Maersk in 2025.
Incident Types AMM vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for A.P. Moller - Maersk in 2025.
Incident History — AMM (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AMM cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
AMM Company Subsidiaries
A.P. Moller - Maersk is an integrated transport and logistics company; going all the way, together, for our customers and society. ALL THE WAY is our commitment to connect the world so that everyone has both the possibility and the ability to trade, grow and thrive. The company employs roughly 110.000 employees across operations in 130 countries.
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AMM CyberSecurity News
November 28, 2025 07:57 AM
Cybersecurity in European Shipping: Lessons from Maersk’s Experience
Explore how Maersk's cyber incident reshaped cybersecurity strategies in European shipping. Learn essential lessons to protect maritime...
June 05, 2025 07:00 AM
#Infosec2025: Cybersecurity Lessons From Maersk’s Former CISO
2017 ransomware attack on shipping company A P Moller Maersk marked a turning point for the cybersecurity industry, according to its former...
April 15, 2025 07:00 AM
Maritime Vulnerabilities: Coast Guard focusing on cybersecurity threats
A new Coast Guard rule for cybersecurity in the US marine transportation system will go into effect in July.
April 01, 2025 07:00 AM
Securing the Supply Chain: Cyber Security's Importance in Logistics
Explore why cybersecurity is vital in logistics, how it protects supply chains from evolving digital threats, and advanced security measures...
February 07, 2025 08:00 AM
Cybersecurity 2025 | How businesses can shore up their supply chains in the era of cyber threats
When it comes to cyber safety, you're only as strong as your weakest link. Hear from @Andy Powell, CISO @A.P. Moller - Maersk on why...
January 27, 2025 08:00 AM
5 cybersecurity priorities that demand your attention
Security leaders must strengthen their defenses against everyday threats while preparing for potentially devastating attacks.
October 09, 2024 07:00 AM
“Cybersecurity is a Hoax” and other Maritime Misconceptions
With new rules on Cyber Security coming down from the U.S. Coast Guard, Angeliki Zisimatou, Director Cybersecurity, ABS,…
October 04, 2024 07:00 AM
Friend & Foe: AI’s Position in Threat Intelligence
While AI's rapid growth carries cyber vulnerability risks the tech also promises improvements in profiling the very cybersecurity threats it...
September 16, 2024 07:00 AM
From NotPetya to Today’s Global Conflict Landscape: Cyberpolitical Risk Emerges as a Critical Challenge to Business & Society
In the 19th century, Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz famously stated that war is politics by other means. Nearly two hundred years...
Frequently Asked Questions
Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
AMM CyberSecurity History Information
Official Website of A.P. Moller - Maersk
The official website of A.P. Moller - Maersk is http://www.maersk.com.
A.P. Moller - Maersk’s AI-Generated Cybersecurity Score
According to Rankiteo, A.P. Moller - Maersk’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 801, reflecting their Good security posture.
How many security badges does A.P. Moller - Maersk’ have ?
According to Rankiteo, A.P. Moller - Maersk currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
Does A.P. Moller - Maersk have SOC 2 Type 1 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, A.P. Moller - Maersk is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
Does A.P. Moller - Maersk have SOC 2 Type 2 certification ?
According to Rankiteo, A.P. Moller - Maersk does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
Does A.P. Moller - Maersk comply with GDPR ?
According to Rankiteo, A.P. Moller - Maersk is not listed as GDPR compliant.
Does A.P. Moller - Maersk have PCI DSS certification ?
According to Rankiteo, A.P. Moller - Maersk does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
Does A.P. Moller - Maersk comply with HIPAA ?
According to Rankiteo, A.P. Moller - Maersk is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
Does A.P. Moller - Maersk have ISO 27001 certification ?
According to Rankiteo,A.P. Moller - Maersk is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Industry Classification of A.P. Moller - Maersk
A.P. Moller - Maersk operates primarily in the Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage industry.
Number of Employees at A.P. Moller - Maersk
A.P. Moller - Maersk employs approximately 79,448 people worldwide.
Subsidiaries Owned by A.P. Moller - Maersk
A.P. Moller - Maersk presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
A.P. Moller - Maersk’s LinkedIn Followers
A.P. Moller - Maersk’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 2,242,896 followers.
NAICS Classification of A.P. Moller - Maersk
A.P. Moller - Maersk is classified under the NAICS code 47, which corresponds to Transportation and Warehousing.
A.P. Moller - Maersk’s Presence on Crunchbase
No, A.P. Moller - Maersk does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
A.P. Moller - Maersk’s Presence on LinkedIn
Yes, A.P. Moller - Maersk maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/maersk-group.
Cybersecurity Incidents Involving A.P. Moller - Maersk
As of December 14, 2025, Rankiteo reports that A.P. Moller - Maersk has experienced 1 cybersecurity incidents.
Number of Peer and Competitor Companies
A.P. Moller - Maersk has an estimated 6,259 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
What types of cybersecurity incidents have occurred at A.P. Moller - Maersk ?
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack.
What was the total financial impact of these incidents on A.P. Moller - Maersk ?
Total Financial Loss: The total financial loss from these incidents is estimated to be $300 million.
How does A.P. Moller - Maersk detect and respond to cybersecurity incidents ?
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an incident response plan activated with maersk (notpetya: global it recovery), incident response plan activated with port of rijeka (unspecified), incident response plan activated with u.s. coast guard mandates (2025 rule), and third party assistance with cybersecurity firms (e.g., maersk’s recovery), third party assistance with government agencies (e.g., nato ccdcoe warnings), and law enforcement notified with maersk (notpetya attributed to russian military), law enforcement notified with potential notifications for port of rijeka/marinemax, and containment measures with isolation of infected systems (maersk), containment measures with manual overrides (ot failures), containment measures with gnss backup systems (jamming mitigation), and remediation measures with system rebuilds (maersk: 45,000 pcs/4,000 servers), remediation measures with software patching (outdated systems), remediation measures with supply chain audits (third-party risks), and recovery measures with maersk: 10-day global recovery (notpetya), recovery measures with port of rijeka: data restoration (8base), recovery measures with iranian tankers: communications reestablishment, and communication strategy with public disclosures (maersk, marinemax), communication strategy with stakeholder advisories (imo/nis2 compliance), communication strategy with customer notifications (data breaches), and network segmentation with recommended (e.g., imo guidelines), and enhanced monitoring with marlink’s threat tracking (1,800 vessels, 2024), enhanced monitoring with ai-driven anomaly detection (emerging)..
Incident Details
Can you provide details on each incident ?
Title: Maritime Cybersecurity Threats and Incidents (2017–2024)
Description: The maritime sector, including ships, ports, and terminals, faces escalating cyber threats due to modernization, geopolitical tensions, and the adoption of AI. Incidents range from ransomware attacks (e.g., Maersk's NotPetya in 2017) to GNSS jamming/spoofing and AI-powered attacks. Vulnerabilities stem from outdated systems, supply chain risks, lack of in-house expertise (only 17% of shipyards have cybersecurity capabilities), and fragmented cybersecurity governance across public/private actors. High-profile cases include the MV Dali power loss (2024, no confirmed cyberattack but raised concerns), the Port of Rijeka ransomware attack by 8Base, and Lab-Dookhtegan’s disruption of 60+ Iranian oil tankers. Regulatory responses include the U.S. Coast Guard’s 2025 rule, EU’s NIS2 Directive, and IMO’s updated ISM Code guidelines.
Type: Ransomware
Attack Vector: Compromised Software Updates (NotPetya via Ukrainian accounting software)Phishing/Social EngineeringOutdated/Poorly Maintained SystemsThird-Party Vendor VulnerabilitiesGNSS Jamming/Spoofing (Russia, Iran, China)AI-Assisted Exploits (e.g., subverting AI assistants)Manual Override of Digital Systems (human error)
Vulnerability Exploited: Lack of In-House Cybersecurity Expertise (17% of shipyards)Fragmented Cybersecurity Governance (no common procedures)Limited Supply Chain Visibility (beyond first-tier vendors)Outdated Software (e.g., Iranian oil tankers)Poorly Secured OT Systems (e.g., MV Dali electrical blackout)Absence of Standardized Risk AssessmentsInsufficient Workforce Training (phishing/social engineering)
Threat Actor: Name: Russian Military (NotPetya), Type: State-Sponsored, Motivation: Geopolitical Disruption, Name: 8Base Ransomware Group, Type: Financially Motivated, Motivation: Extortion, Name: Lab-Dookhtegan, Type: Hacktivist/State-Aligned, Motivation: Disruption (targeted Iranian maritime sector), Name: Unspecified State Actors (Russia, Iran, China), Type: State-Sponsored, Motivation: GNSS Jamming/Spoofing for Strategic Advantage, Name: Financially Motivated Hackers, Type: Cybercriminal, Motivation: Ransomware/Data Theft.
Motivation: Financial Gain (Ransomware)Geopolitical Disruption (State Actors)Espionage (Strategic Maritime Data)Hacktivism (e.g., Lab-Dookhtegan)Operational Sabotage (e.g., GNSS Interference)
What are the most common types of attacks the company has faced ?
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Cyber Attack.
How does the company identify the attack vectors used in incidents ?
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Compromised Software Update (NotPetya via Ukrainian accounting software)Phishing/Social Engineering (MarineMax and Port of Rijeka)Outdated Software (Iranian Tankers)Third-Party Vendor Vulnerabilities (Supply Chain).
Impact of the Incidents
What was the impact of each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Financial Loss: Maersk: $300M (NotPetya, 2017)Unspecified losses for MarineMax, Port of Rijeka, and other targets
Data Compromised: Financial records (maersk, marinemax, port of rijeka), Employee/customer data (marinemax), Shipping routes/cargo data (ports), Personal data (port of rijeka: invoices, contracts, accounting records), Navigation/logistics data (gnss spoofing)
Systems Affected: 76 Port Terminals (Maersk, 2017)45,000+ PCs and 4,000 Servers (Maersk)Accounting Systems (MarineMax)Communications (60+ Iranian Oil Tankers)GNSS Navigation (Jamming/Spoofing)OT Systems (MV Dali power loss)
Downtime: ['Maersk: Weeks (NotPetya)', 'Port of Rijeka: Unspecified (8Base Attack)', 'Iranian Tankers: Communications Disabled (Lab-Dookhtegan)']
Operational Impact: Collapse of Francis Scott Key Bridge (MV Dali, indirect)Disruption of 80% Global Trade (Port Targeting)Manual Overrides Required (Digital System Failures)Supply Chain Delays (Ransomware/OT Attacks)
Revenue Loss: ['Maersk: $300M (2017)', 'Potential losses for Port of Rijeka, MarineMax, and other entities']
Customer Complaints: ['Likely for MarineMax (data breach)', 'Potential for Maersk/Port of Rijeka (service disruptions)']
Brand Reputation Impact: Maersk (NotPetya)MarineMax (Customer/Employee Data Exposure)Port of Rijeka (Confidential Data Theft)
Legal Liabilities: Potential GDPR Violations (EU Ports)U.S. Coast Guard Reporting Requirements (2025 Rule)IMO ISM Code Non-Compliance Risks
Identity Theft Risk: ['Employee/Customer Data (MarineMax, Port of Rijeka)']
Payment Information Risk: ['Financial Records (Maersk, MarineMax, Port of Rijeka)']
What is the average financial loss per incident ?
Average Financial Loss: The average financial loss per incident is $300.00 million.
What types of data are most commonly compromised in incidents ?
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Financial Records, Employee Data, Customer Data, Shipping Routes/Cargo Data, Personal Data (Contracts, Invoices), Accounting Records and .
Which entities were affected by each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Entity Name: Maersk
Entity Type: Shipping Company
Industry: Maritime/Logistics
Location: Global (HQ: Denmark)
Size: Large (World’s largest shipping company)
Customers Affected: Global supply chain partners
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Entity Name: Port of Rijeka
Entity Type: Port Authority
Industry: Maritime/Logistics
Location: Croatia
Size: Medium
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Entity Name: MarineMax
Entity Type: Boat Retailer
Industry: Maritime/Retail
Location: USA
Size: Large
Customers Affected: Yes (financial/employee/customer data)
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Entity Name: Iranian Oil Tankers (60+ vessels)
Entity Type: Shipping Fleet
Industry: Oil/Gas Maritime
Location: Iran/Global
Size: Large
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Entity Name: MV Dali
Entity Type: Cargo Ship
Industry: Maritime
Location: Baltimore, USA (incident location)
Size: Medium
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Entity Name: Francis Scott Key Bridge
Entity Type: Infrastructure
Industry: Transportation
Location: Baltimore, USA
Response to the Incidents
What measures were taken in response to each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Maersk (NotPetya: Global IT Recovery)', 'Port of Rijeka (Unspecified)', 'U.S. Coast Guard Mandates (2025 Rule)']
Third Party Assistance: Cybersecurity Firms (E.G., Maersk’S Recovery), Government Agencies (E.G., Nato Ccdcoe Warnings).
Law Enforcement Notified: Maersk (NotPetya attributed to Russian military), Potential notifications for Port of Rijeka/MarineMax,
Containment Measures: Isolation of Infected Systems (Maersk)Manual Overrides (OT Failures)GNSS Backup Systems (Jamming Mitigation)
Remediation Measures: System Rebuilds (Maersk: 45,000 PCs/4,000 servers)Software Patching (Outdated Systems)Supply Chain Audits (Third-Party Risks)
Recovery Measures: Maersk: 10-Day Global Recovery (NotPetya)Port of Rijeka: Data Restoration (8Base)Iranian Tankers: Communications Reestablishment
Communication Strategy: Public Disclosures (Maersk, MarineMax)Stakeholder Advisories (IMO/NIS2 Compliance)Customer Notifications (Data Breaches)
Network Segmentation: ['Recommended (e.g., IMO Guidelines)']
Enhanced Monitoring: Marlink’s Threat Tracking (1,800 vessels, 2024)AI-Driven Anomaly Detection (Emerging)
What is the company's incident response plan?
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Maersk (NotPetya: Global IT Recovery), Port of Rijeka (Unspecified), U.S. Coast Guard Mandates (2025 Rule), .
How does the company involve third-party assistance in incident response ?
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Cybersecurity Firms (e.g., Maersk’s recovery), Government Agencies (e.g., NATO CCDCOE warnings), .
Data Breach Information
What type of data was compromised in each breach ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Type of Data Compromised: Financial records, Employee data, Customer data, Shipping routes/cargo data, Personal data (contracts, invoices), Accounting records
Sensitivity of Data: High (financial, PII, operational)
Data Exfiltration: Port of Rijeka (8Base claimed theft)MarineMax (online exposure)Potential in NotPetya (Maersk)
Data Encryption: ['Ransomware Encryption (NotPetya, 8Base)']
File Types Exposed: InvoicesReceiptsEmployment ContractsAccounting RecordsNavigation Logs (GNSS Data)
Personally Identifiable Information: Employee/Customer Data (MarineMax, Port of Rijeka)
What measures does the company take to prevent data exfiltration ?
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: System Rebuilds (Maersk: 45,000 PCs/4,000 servers), Software Patching (Outdated Systems), Supply Chain Audits (Third-Party Risks), .
How does the company handle incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) ?
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by isolation of infected systems (maersk), manual overrides (ot failures), gnss backup systems (jamming mitigation) and .
Ransomware Information
Was ransomware involved in any of the incidents ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Ransom Demanded: ['8Base (Port of Rijeka: unspecified)', 'NotPetya (Maersk: no ransom demanded, wiper malware)']
Ransom Paid: Maersk: None (NotPetya was wiper malware)Port of Rijeka: Unspecified
Ransomware Strain: NotPetya (2017)8Base (2024)
Data Encryption: ['NotPetya (Maersk)', '8Base (Port of Rijeka)']
Data Exfiltration: ['8Base (Port of Rijeka: claimed theft)']
How does the company recover data encrypted by ransomware ?
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Maersk: 10-Day Global Recovery (NotPetya), Port of Rijeka: Data Restoration (8Base), Iranian Tankers: Communications Reestablishment, .
Regulatory Compliance
Were there any regulatory violations and fines imposed for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Regulations Violated: Potential GDPR (EU Ports/Data Breaches), IMO ISM Code (Cybersecurity Integration), U.S. Coast Guard 2025 Rule (Incident Reporting),
Regulatory Notifications: Mandatory under NIS2 (EU)U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center (2025 Rule)IMO MSC.428(98) Reporting
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What lessons were learned from each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Lessons Learned: Fragmented cybersecurity governance increases risk; standardized procedures are critical., Supply chain visibility must extend beyond first-tier vendors to mitigate third-party risks., OT systems (e.g., ship navigation) require air-gapping/segmentation to prevent cascading failures., Workforce training is essential to counter phishing/social engineering (human error = top risk)., AI-powered attacks demand continuous threat monitoring and adaptive defenses., GNSS jamming/spoofing highlights the need for redundant navigation systems., Regulatory compliance (NIS2, IMO, U.S. Coast Guard) is evolving; proactive adaptation is necessary.
What recommendations were made to prevent future incidents ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Recommendations: Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting)., Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule).
What are the key lessons learned from past incidents ?
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Fragmented cybersecurity governance increases risk; standardized procedures are critical.,Supply chain visibility must extend beyond first-tier vendors to mitigate third-party risks.,OT systems (e.g., ship navigation) require air-gapping/segmentation to prevent cascading failures.,Workforce training is essential to counter phishing/social engineering (human error = top risk).,AI-powered attacks demand continuous threat monitoring and adaptive defenses.,GNSS jamming/spoofing highlights the need for redundant navigation systems.,Regulatory compliance (NIS2, IMO, U.S. Coast Guard) is evolving; proactive adaptation is necessary.
References
Where can I find more information about each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Source: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)
URL: https://ccdcoe.org/
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Source: Marlink’s 2024 Maritime Cyber Threat Report
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Source: U.S. Coast Guard 2025 Cybersecurity Rule
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Source: EU NIS2 Directive
URL: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis2-directive
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Source: Maersk NotPetya Post-Incident Report
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Source: Port of Rijeka 8Base Ransomware Attack (2024)
Where can stakeholders find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)Url: https://ccdcoe.org/, and Source: Marlink’s 2024 Maritime Cyber Threat Report, and Source: U.S. Coast Guard 2025 Cybersecurity RuleUrl: https://www.uscg.mil/, and Source: EU NIS2 DirectiveUrl: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis2-directive, and Source: IMO ISM Code (MSC.428(98))Url: https://www.imo.org/, and Source: Maersk NotPetya Post-Incident Report, and Source: Port of Rijeka 8Base Ransomware Attack (2024).
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the investigation for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Investigation Status: ['Maersk NotPetya: Attributed to Russian military (confirmed)', 'MV Dali: No confirmed cyberattack (electrical failure under investigation)', 'Port of Rijeka: Ongoing (8Base claims unverified)', 'Iranian Tankers: Lab-Dookhtegan claimed responsibility (verified communications disruption)']
How does the company communicate the status of incident investigations to stakeholders ?
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Public Disclosures (Maersk, Marinemax), Stakeholder Advisories (Imo/Nis2 Compliance) and Customer Notifications (Data Breaches).
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
Were there any advisories issued to stakeholders or customers for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Stakeholder Advisories: Imo: Urges Cyber Risk Assessments And Ism Code Integration., Nato Ccdcoe: Warns Of State-Sponsored Threats To Port Infrastructure., U.S. Coast Guard: Mandates Cybersecurity Officers And Incident Reporting By 2025., Eu: Nis2 Directive Requires Maritime Operators To Report Incidents And Secure Supply Chains..
Customer Advisories: Maersk: Notified partners of NotPetya impact (2017).MarineMax: Advised customers on data breach risks (2024).Port of Rijeka: Likely notified stakeholders of ransomware attack (2024).
What advisories does the company provide to stakeholders and customers following an incident ?
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Imo: Urges Cyber Risk Assessments And Ism Code Integration., Nato Ccdcoe: Warns Of State-Sponsored Threats To Port Infrastructure., U.S. Coast Guard: Mandates Cybersecurity Officers And Incident Reporting By 2025., Eu: Nis2 Directive Requires Maritime Operators To Report Incidents And Secure Supply Chains., Maersk: Notified Partners Of Notpetya Impact (2017)., Marinemax: Advised Customers On Data Breach Risks (2024)., Port Of Rijeka: Likely Notified Stakeholders Of Ransomware Attack (2024). and .
Initial Access Broker
How did the initial access broker gain entry for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Entry Point: Compromised Software Update (Notpetya Via Ukrainian Accounting Software), Phishing/Social Engineering (Marinemax, Port Of Rijeka), Outdated Software (Iranian Tankers), Third-Party Vendor Vulnerabilities (Supply Chain),
Backdoors Established: ['Potential in NotPetya (lateral movement)', 'Possible in 8Base/Port of Rijeka attack']
High Value Targets: Shipping Routes/Cargo Data (Ports), Financial Systems (Maersk, Marinemax), Navigation/Ot Systems (Mv Dali, Iranian Tankers),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Shipping Routes/Cargo Data (Ports), Financial Systems (Maersk, Marinemax), Navigation/Ot Systems (Mv Dali, Iranian Tankers),
Post-Incident Analysis
What were the root causes and corrective actions taken for each incident ?
Incident : Ransomware MAE508082925
Root Causes: Lack Of Cybersecurity Expertise (17% Of Shipyards), Fragmented Governance (No Common Incident Response Procedures), Supply Chain Blind Spots (Limited Visibility Beyond Tier 1 Vendors), Outdated/Poorly Maintained Systems (Iranian Tankers), Insufficient Ot/It Segmentation (Mv Dali, Maersk), Human Error (Phishing/Social Engineering Success), Regulatory Gaps (Pre-2025 U.S. Coast Guard Rules),
Corrective Actions: Maersk: Global It Infrastructure Overhaul Post-Notpetya., Imo: Updated Ism Code To Mandate Cyber Risk Assessments., U.S. Coast Guard: 2025 Rule For Cybersecurity Officers And Incident Reporting., Eu: Nis2 Directive Enforcement For Maritime Sector., Ports: Increased Third-Party Vendor Audits (E.G., Rijeka Post-Attack)., Shipping Companies: Ai Threat Monitoring And Workforce Training Programs.,
What is the company's process for conducting post-incident analysis ?
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Cybersecurity Firms (E.G., Maersk’S Recovery), Government Agencies (E.G., Nato Ccdcoe Warnings), , Marlink’S Threat Tracking (1,800 Vessels, 2024), Ai-Driven Anomaly Detection (Emerging), .
What corrective actions has the company taken based on post-incident analysis ?
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Maersk: Global It Infrastructure Overhaul Post-Notpetya., Imo: Updated Ism Code To Mandate Cyber Risk Assessments., U.S. Coast Guard: 2025 Rule For Cybersecurity Officers And Incident Reporting., Eu: Nis2 Directive Enforcement For Maritime Sector., Ports: Increased Third-Party Vendor Audits (E.G., Rijeka Post-Attack)., Shipping Companies: Ai Threat Monitoring And Workforce Training Programs., .
Additional Questions
General Information
Has the company ever paid ransoms ?
Ransom Payment History: The company has Paid ransoms in the past.
What was the amount of the last ransom demanded ?
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was ['8Base (Port of Rijeka: unspecified)', 'NotPetya (Maersk: no ransom demanded, wiper malware)'].
Who was the attacking group in the last incident ?
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Name: Russian Military (NotPetya)Type: State-SponsoredMotivation: Geopolitical DisruptionName: 8Base Ransomware GroupType: Financially MotivatedMotivation: ExtortionName: Lab-DookhteganType: Hacktivist/State-AlignedMotivation: Disruption (targeted Iranian maritime sector)Name: Unspecified State Actors (Russia, Iran and China)Type: State-SponsoredMotivation: GNSS Jamming/Spoofing for Strategic AdvantageName: Financially Motivated HackersType: CybercriminalMotivation: Ransomware/Data Theft.
Impact of the Incidents
What was the highest financial loss from an incident ?
Highest Financial Loss: The highest financial loss from an incident was ['Maersk: $300M (NotPetya, 2017)', 'Unspecified losses for MarineMax, Port of Rijeka, and other targets'].
What was the most significant data compromised in an incident ?
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Financial Records (Maersk, MarineMax, Port of Rijeka), Employee/Customer Data (MarineMax), Shipping Routes/Cargo Data (Ports), Personal Data (Port of Rijeka: invoices, contracts, accounting records), Navigation/Logistics Data (GNSS Spoofing) and .
What was the most significant system affected in an incident ?
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident were 76 Port Terminals (Maersk, 2017)45,000+ PCs and 4,000 Servers (Maersk)Accounting Systems (MarineMax)Communications (60+ Iranian Oil Tankers)GNSS Navigation (Jamming/Spoofing)OT Systems (MV Dali power loss).
Response to the Incidents
What third-party assistance was involved in the most recent incident ?
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was cybersecurity firms (e.g., maersk’s recovery), government agencies (e.g., nato ccdcoe warnings), .
What containment measures were taken in the most recent incident ?
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident was Isolation of Infected Systems (Maersk)Manual Overrides (OT Failures)GNSS Backup Systems (Jamming Mitigation).
Data Breach Information
What was the most sensitive data compromised in a breach ?
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were Navigation/Logistics Data (GNSS Spoofing), Shipping Routes/Cargo Data (Ports), Employee/Customer Data (MarineMax), Financial Records (Maersk, MarineMax, Port of Rijeka), Personal Data (Port of Rijeka: invoices, contracts and accounting records).
Ransomware Information
What was the highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident ?
Highest Ransom Demanded: The highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident was ['8Base (Port of Rijeka: unspecified)', 'NotPetya (Maersk: no ransom demanded, wiper malware)'].
What was the highest ransom paid in a ransomware incident ?
Highest Ransom Paid: The highest ransom paid in a ransomware incident was ['Maersk: None (NotPetya was wiper malware)', 'Port of Rijeka: Unspecified'].
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
What was the most significant lesson learned from past incidents ?
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Regulatory compliance (NIS2, IMO, U.S. Coast Guard) is evolving; proactive adaptation is necessary.
What was the most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity ?
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Appoint **dedicated Cybersecurity Officers** (per U.S. Coast Guard 2025 rule)., Develop **incident response playbooks** for ransomware, OT failures, and data breaches., Mandate **cybersecurity training** for all staff, including manual override procedures., Adopt **IMO ISM Code updates** and align with NIS2/U.S. Coast Guard requirements., Deploy **GNSS backup systems** (e.g., inertial navigation) to counter jamming/spoofing., Establish **cross-sector collaboration** (public/private info-sharing on threats)., Invest in **third-party vendor audits** to map supply chain risks beyond Tier 1., Leverage **AI for threat detection** while securing AI systems against adversarial attacks., Implement **network segmentation** to isolate OT/IT systems (e.g., ship navigation vs. accounting). and Conduct **continuous risk assessments** for AI-driven and supply chain threats..
References
What is the most recent source of information about an incident ?
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Maersk NotPetya Post-Incident Report, EU NIS2 Directive, Port of Rijeka 8Base Ransomware Attack (2024), IMO ISM Code (MSC.428(98)), U.S. Coast Guard 2025 Cybersecurity Rule, Marlink’s 2024 Maritime Cyber Threat Report and NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).
What is the most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices ?
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://ccdcoe.org/, https://www.uscg.mil/, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis2-directive, https://www.imo.org/ .
Investigation Status
What is the current status of the most recent investigation ?
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is ['Maersk NotPetya: Attributed to Russian military (confirmed)', 'MV Dali: No confirmed cyberattack (electrical failure under investigation)', 'Port of Rijeka: Ongoing (8Base claims unverified)', 'Iranian Tankers: Lab-Dookhtegan claimed responsibility (verified communications disruption)'].
Stakeholder and Customer Advisories
What was the most recent stakeholder advisory issued ?
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was IMO: Urges cyber risk assessments and ISM Code integration., NATO CCDCOE: Warns of state-sponsored threats to port infrastructure., U.S. Coast Guard: Mandates Cybersecurity Officers and incident reporting by 2025., EU: NIS2 Directive requires maritime operators to report incidents and secure supply chains., .
What was the most recent customer advisory issued ?
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued was an Maersk: Notified partners of NotPetya impact (2017).MarineMax: Advised customers on data breach risks (2024).Port of Rijeka: Likely notified stakeholders of ransomware attack (2024).
Initial Access Broker
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Latest Global CVEs (Not Company-Specific)
Description
A weakness has been identified in itsourcecode Online Pet Shop Management System 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /pet1/addcnp.php. This manipulation of the argument cnpname causes sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
cvss3
Base: 7.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
cvss4
Base: 6.9
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
A security flaw has been discovered in Tenda AX9 22.03.01.46. This affects the function image_check of the component httpd. The manipulation results in use of weak hash. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. It is indicated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 2.6
Severity: HIGH
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
cvss3
Base: 3.7
Severity: HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
cvss4
Base: 6.3
Severity: HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
A weakness has been identified in code-projects Student File Management System 1.0. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /admin/update_student.php. This manipulation of the argument stud_id causes sql injection. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
cvss3
Base: 7.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
cvss4
Base: 6.9
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
A security flaw has been discovered in code-projects Student File Management System 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /admin/save_user.php. The manipulation of the argument firstname results in sql injection. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
cvss3
Base: 7.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
cvss4
Base: 6.9
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Description
A vulnerability was identified in code-projects Student File Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /admin/update_user.php. The manipulation of the argument user_id leads to sql injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.
Risk Information
cvss2
Base: 7.5
Severity: LOW
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
cvss3
Base: 7.3
Severity: LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
cvss4
Base: 6.9
Severity: LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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curl -i -X GET 'https://api.rankiteo.com/underwriter-getcompany-history?linkedin_id=maersk-group' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
RapidWhat Do We Measure ?
Incident
Finding
Grade
Digital Assets
Every week, Rankiteo analyzes billions of signals to give organizations a sharper, faster view of emerging risks. With deeper, more actionable intelligence at their fingertips, security teams can outpace threat actors, respond instantly to Zero-Day attacks, and dramatically shrink their risk exposure window.
These are some of the factors we use to calculate the overall score:
Network Security
Identify exposed access points, detect misconfigured SSL certificates, and uncover vulnerabilities across the network infrastructure.
SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)
Gain visibility into the software components used within an organization to detect vulnerabilities, manage risk, and ensure supply chain security.
CMDB (Configuration Management Database)
Monitor and manage all IT assets and their configurations to ensure accurate, real-time visibility across the company's technology environment.
Threat Intelligence
Leverage real-time insights on active threats, malware campaigns, and emerging vulnerabilities to proactively defend against evolving cyberattacks.
Rankiteo is a unified scoring and risk platform that analyzes billions of signals weekly to help organizations gain faster, more actionable insights into emerging threats. Empowering teams to outpace adversaries and reduce exposure.
