Comparison Overview
Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics North America

Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics North America
8680 Cambie Street, Vancouver, BC, CA, V6P 6M9
Last Update: 06/06/2026
Founded in 1995 by six co-founders—Mark and Mo Constantine, Rowena Bird, Helen Ambrosen, Liz Bennett, and Paul Greeves—Lush began as a small cosmetics shop in Poole, Dorset, UK. Since then we have been pioneers in the beauty industry, committed to creating fresh, handma...

Grupo Boticário
Avenida Doutor Dário Lopes dos Santos 2197, Curitiba, Paraná, BR, 80210-010
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Beleza é o negócio do Grupo Boticário. Para nós, ela se traduz em nossas quatro unidades de negócio com atuação no setor cosmético: O Boticário, Eudora, quem disse, berenice? e The Beauty Box. A beleza também está no empreendedorismo, na sustentabilidade, inovação, étic...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics North America







Grupo Boticário






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Personal Care Product Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics North America in 2026.
Incidents vs Personal Care Product Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grupo Boticário in 2026.
Incident History - Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics North America (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics North America cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Grupo Boticário (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grupo Boticário cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Lush Fresh Handmade Cosmetics North America

Grupo Boticário
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Deserialization of untrusted data in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection. When the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds). Even below the overflow threshold, one connection's net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection's reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer's data into another's parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption. The fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buffer. Affects Zephyr releases shipping the Broadcast Assistant with the shared buffer, including v4.4.0 and earlier.
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-26 contains a memory leak vulnerability in the VIFF encoder when memory allocation fails. Attackers can trigger allocation failures by processing specially crafted VIFF images to exhaust available memory and cause denial of service.
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-26 contains a use-after-free vulnerability in the FormatMagickCaption method when memory allocation fails. Attackers can trigger memory allocation failures to cause a dangling pointer to reference freed memory, potentially enabling denial of service or code execution.
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-26 contains a policy bypass vulnerability in the APNG encoder and external delegates due to missing validation checks. Attackers can write files to disallowed paths by bypassing configured policy restrictions through the APNG encoding process.