Comparison Overview
Love's Travel Stops

Love's Travel Stops
10601 N Pennsylvania, Oklahoma City, 73120, US
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Founded in 1964 by Tom Love, Love’s Family of Companies is headquartered in Oklahoma City, and remains entirely family-owned and operated. With more than 600 locations in 42 states, Love’s approximate growth rate is 40 stores per year. From the first filling station in ...

Leroy Merlin
Rue Chanzy – Lezennes, Lille cedex 9, France, FR, 59712
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Leroy Merlin is a major player in the global DIY market. We help people around the world with all their home improvement projects, from renovations and extensions, to decoration and repairs... We offer a wide range of DIY solutions that cover plumbing, lighting, heatin...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Love's Travel Stops







Leroy Merlin






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Love's Travel Stops in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Leroy Merlin in 2026.
Incident History - Love's Travel Stops (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Love's Travel Stops cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Leroy Merlin (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Leroy Merlin cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Love's Travel Stops

Leroy Merlin
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.