Comparison Overview
LOTTE chemical

LOTTE chemical
14-16Fl, Lotte World Tower 300 Olympic-ro, Seoul, Songpa-gu, 05551, KR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
1976년에 설립된 롯데케미칼은 첨단석유화학기술을 토착화하고 꾸준한 기술개발에 주력하여 그 입지를 탄탄히 다지고 있습니다. 롯데케미칼 여수, 대산, 울산 공장은 국내외 최고 규모를 자랑합니다. 올레핀, 방향족 사업과 같은 석유화학 기초원료 및 제품 생산은 물론 꾸준한 공장 증설과 사업 확장으로 원료에서 제품에 이르는 수직계열화를 이뤘습니다. 효율적인 공정을 통해 고품질의 제품을 생산하는 롯데케미칼의 대표제품으로는 에틸렌, HDPE, LDPE, LLDPE, PP, 기능성수지, E...

Air Liquide
75 quai d'Orsay, Paris, 75007, FR
Last Update: 08/07/2026
Air Liquide is a world leader in gases, technologies and services for industry and healthcare. Present in 72 countries with 67,800 employees, the Group serves more than 4 million customers and patients. Oxygen, nitrogen and hydrogen are essential small molecules for lif...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

LOTTE chemical







Air Liquide






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Chemical Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for LOTTE chemical in 2026.
Incidents vs Chemical Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Air Liquide in 2026.
Incident History - LOTTE chemical (X = Date, Y = Severity)
LOTTE chemical cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Air Liquide (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Air Liquide cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

LOTTE chemical

Air Liquide
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Cline is an autonomous coding agent as an SDK, IDE extension, or CLI assistant. Prior to 3.0.30, the Cline Hub dashboard server launched by the cline dashboard command accepts WebSocket connections on the /browser endpoint without validating the Origin header, and when ROOM_SECRET is unset for local 127.0.0.1 binds, isAuthorizedBrowserRequest() allows attacker-controlled websites to send desktopCommand frames that read workspace state, mutate MCP and provider settings, and trigger command execution when a provider or model is configured. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.30.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. In version 1.9.0, CoreWCF SPNEGO SecurityContextToken negotiation can expose the proof key recovered from the RSTR when TransportWithMessageCredential with Windows client credentials and session establishment are used, allowing an observer to impersonate the authenticated Windows principal and decrypt or forge WS-SecureConversation traffic. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF WS-Security endorsing and supporting signature verification does not ensure the selected ds:Signature covers the expected Security header target, allowing an attacker with one captured signed SOAP envelope to replay arbitrary service operations as the victim principal. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0589692d4b9a41d21b34ac48281e95f6df7f4ce5
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/30aef805270976c42477e3f2a05f4e563d86e247
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/4618f24165ad018ad3ed2636bf8c3bc87d2a3be2
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-gqv6-pwcg-87r8
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0 token validation does not correctly resolve the issuer signing key or require signed tokens when IdentityConfiguration is used with federated bindings, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to impersonate any principal the trusted STS could issue. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0b8c8af851260e85e8402af53233d1b8f87dfb6f
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0e63c2cca55763d8be6b226a234579280a09e7b6
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/e5cc9b6a4ecc102a50d782093bfc72e0790abe3d
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML token validation does not enforce SubjectConfirmation method URIs or holder-of-key proof keys in SamlSecurityTokenHandler, allowing holder-of-key downgrade or custom confirmation method assertions to authenticate a subject without proving authority over the assertion. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/6a99df3242f54acd6f89edfd6050430b72d0c685
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/86dd3232b6b8aaf32281be9e8d798afad6145d58
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/9eb9b46d1c2af06fb71f656a02f4d5b4649c1f03
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4