Comparison Overview
Lincoln France

Lincoln France
65, Avenue Édouard Vaillant, Boulogne-Billancourt, Île-de-France, 92100, FR
Last Update: 01/11/2025
LINCOLN est depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans une Entreprise de Service du Numérique, pionnière en science des données et proposant des prestations d’expertise, de conseil et d’accompagnement en Modern BI et en Data Science. Dans un contexte effervescent et propice à l’inno...

Persistent Systems
Bhageerath, 402 E, Senapati Bapat Road, Pune, Maharashtra, IN, 411016
Last Update: 02/04/2026
We are an AI-led, platform-driven Digital Engineering and Enterprise Modernization partner, combining deep technical expertise and industry experience to help our clients anticipate what’s next. Our offerings and proven solutions create a unique competitive advantage fo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Lincoln France







Persistent Systems






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Lincoln France in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Persistent Systems in 2026.
Incident History - Lincoln France (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lincoln France cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Persistent Systems (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Persistent Systems cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Lincoln France

Persistent Systems
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/handler.go sendFile handler opened files using a cleaned path but derived the authorization filename from raw req.URL.Path, so a trailing slash could bypass .goshs ACL-file protection and block-list checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/updown.go multipart upload handler split part.FileName() on / but did not reject .., allowing an unauthenticated upload with filename .. to create a file outside the served tree. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.4, the httpserver/server.go wdGuard handled WebDAV MOVE as a write-only method and did not enforce --no-delete, allowing WebDAV clients to delete or overwrite files via MOVE with Overwrite: T. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. From 2.1.3 until 2.1.4, the sftpserver/sftpserver.go password handler used Username != "" && Password != "", so running goshs with -b 'admin:' -sftp and no -fkf left both SFTP authentication handlers unset and allowed unauthenticated file access. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.