Comparison Overview
LGLN Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landesvermessung Niedersachsen

LGLN Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landesvermessung Niedersachsen
Podbielskistraße 331, Hannover, 30659, DE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Geoinformationen berühren inzwischen fast alle Lebensbereiche. Ob Verkehrslenkung, Hochwasserschutz oder die Suche nach einem Restaurant: Ohne Geodaten funktioniert nichts davon. Unser Landesamt sorgt dafür, dass für jedes Gebäude und jede Grenze, jede Fläche und jedes ...

Larsen & Toubro
N.M.Marg, Ballard Estate, Mumbai, Maharashtra, IN, 400001
Last Update: 04/07/2026
Larsen & Toubro is an Indian multinational engaged in EPC Projects, Hi-Tech Manufacturing and Services. It operates in over 50 countries worldwide. A strong, customer-focused approach and the constant quest for top-class quality have enabled L&T to attain and sustain ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

LGLN Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landesvermessung Niedersachsen







Larsen & Toubro






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Executive Offices Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for LGLN Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landesvermessung Niedersachsen in 2026.
Incidents vs Executive Offices Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Larsen & Toubro in 2026.
Incident History - LGLN Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landesvermessung Niedersachsen (X = Date, Y = Severity)
LGLN Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landesvermessung Niedersachsen cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Larsen & Toubro (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Larsen & Toubro cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

LGLN Landesamt für Geoinformation und Landesvermessung Niedersachsen

Larsen & Toubro
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Cline is an autonomous coding agent as an SDK, IDE extension, or CLI assistant. Prior to 3.0.30, the Cline Hub dashboard server launched by the cline dashboard command accepts WebSocket connections on the /browser endpoint without validating the Origin header, and when ROOM_SECRET is unset for local 127.0.0.1 binds, isAuthorizedBrowserRequest() allows attacker-controlled websites to send desktopCommand frames that read workspace state, mutate MCP and provider settings, and trigger command execution when a provider or model is configured. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.30.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. In version 1.9.0, CoreWCF SPNEGO SecurityContextToken negotiation can expose the proof key recovered from the RSTR when TransportWithMessageCredential with Windows client credentials and session establishment are used, allowing an observer to impersonate the authenticated Windows principal and decrypt or forge WS-SecureConversation traffic. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.1.
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF WS-Security endorsing and supporting signature verification does not ensure the selected ds:Signature covers the expected Security header target, allowing an attacker with one captured signed SOAP envelope to replay arbitrary service operations as the victim principal. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0589692d4b9a41d21b34ac48281e95f6df7f4ce5
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/30aef805270976c42477e3f2a05f4e563d86e247
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/4618f24165ad018ad3ed2636bf8c3bc87d2a3be2
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-gqv6-pwcg-87r8
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML 1.1 and SAML 2.0 token validation does not correctly resolve the issuer signing key or require signed tokens when IdentityConfiguration is used with federated bindings, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to impersonate any principal the trusted STS could issue. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0b8c8af851260e85e8402af53233d1b8f87dfb6f
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/0e63c2cca55763d8be6b226a234579280a09e7b6
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/e5cc9b6a4ecc102a50d782093bfc72e0790abe3d
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-xjr9-gg9q-jx3v
CoreWCF is a port of the service side of Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to .NET Core. Prior to 1.8.1 and 1.9.1, CoreWCF SAML token validation does not enforce SubjectConfirmation method URIs or holder-of-key proof keys in SamlSecurityTokenHandler, allowing holder-of-key downgrade or custom confirmation method assertions to authenticate a subject without proving authority over the assertion. This issue is fixed in versions 1.8.1 and 1.9.1.
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/6a99df3242f54acd6f89edfd6050430b72d0c685
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/86dd3232b6b8aaf32281be9e8d798afad6145d58
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/commit/9eb9b46d1c2af06fb71f656a02f4d5b4649c1f03
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.8.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/releases/tag/v1.9.1
- https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-48pq-2xq3-c2m4