Comparison Overview
Leo Burnett Australia

Leo Burnett Australia
21 Harris St, Pyrmont, New South Wales, 2009, AU
Last Update: 13/11/2025
Leo Burnett is a global creative powerhouse with offices in both Sydney and Melbourne. Built upon the belief that what helps people, helps business, Leo Burnett is constantly adapting, shifting and evolving to identify and support the changing needs of today. As a resul...

VML
3 WTC 175 Greenwich Street, New York, New York, US
Last Update: 28/03/2026
VML is a global powerhouse born from the unification of Wunderman Thompson and VMLY&R — two of the world's most powerful and accomplished creative agencies with complementary capabilities and geographic strengths. We have an industry-unique opportunity to provide our cl...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Leo Burnett Australia







VML






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Leo Burnett Australia in 2026.
Incidents vs Advertising Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VML in 2026.
Incident History - Leo Burnett Australia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Leo Burnett Australia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - VML (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VML cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Leo Burnett Australia

VML
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.