Comparison Overview
Raoul LENOIR sas / MEC srl

Raoul LENOIR sas / MEC srl
rue du Bearn, COSNES ET ROMAIN, 54400, FR
Last Update: 23/06/2026
Levage magnétique, séparation, détection des métaux... Depuis près de 70 ans, L'entreprise Raoul LENOIR met son expertise et ses savoir-faire à votre service en développant des applications magnétiques industrielles pour répondre à vos souhaits, quel que soit votre sect...

ANDRITZ
Stattegger Strasse 18, Graz, 8045, AT
Last Update: 01/04/2026
ANDRITZ is an international technology group based in Austria. The company offers a broad portfolio of innovative plants, equipment, systems, services and digital solutions for a wide range of industries and end markets. Sustainability is an integral part of the compa...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Raoul LENOIR sas / MEC srl







ANDRITZ






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Raoul LENOIR sas / MEC srl in 2026.
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ANDRITZ in 2026.
Incident History - Raoul LENOIR sas / MEC srl (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Raoul LENOIR sas / MEC srl cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ANDRITZ (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ANDRITZ cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Raoul LENOIR sas / MEC srl

ANDRITZ
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.