Comparison Overview
Legrand Centroamérica, Ecuador y Caribe

Legrand Centroamérica, Ecuador y Caribe
100 Norte de Cenada, barreal de heredia, heredia, 40104, CR
Last Update: 28/11/2025
El especialista mundial en productos y sistemas para instalaciones eléctricas y redes de comunicación.

WEG
Avenida Pref. Waldemar Grubba, 3300, Jaraguá do Sul, 89256-900, BR
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Founded in 1961, WEG is a global electro-electronic equipment company, operating in the capital goods sector a with focus on electric motors, gearboxes and drives and controls, energy generation and transformers, electrification products and systems, automation and digi...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Legrand Centroamérica, Ecuador y Caribe







WEG






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Legrand Centroamérica, Ecuador y Caribe in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for WEG in 2026.
Incident History - Legrand Centroamérica, Ecuador y Caribe (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Legrand Centroamérica, Ecuador y Caribe cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - WEG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
WEG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Legrand Centroamérica, Ecuador y Caribe

WEG
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.