Ledger Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (LED5093550111925)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Ledger breach identified under incident ID LED5093550111925.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Ledger's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ledgerhq, the number of followers: 70865, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 688 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 684 and after the incident was 664 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Ledger and their customers.

Cryptocurrency Users (Ledger, Trezor, Exodus) recently reported "Nova Stealer macOS Malware Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrency Users", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

A sophisticated new macOS malware campaign dubbed 'Nova Stealer' has emerged, targeting cryptocurrency users through an elaborate scheme that replaces legitimate wallet applications (e.g., Ledger Live, Trezor Suite) with malicious counterparts designed to harvest sensitive rec...

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting macOS systems with Ledger Live, Trezor Suite, or Exodus wallets installed, and exposing cryptocurrency wallet recovery phrases (BIP-39/SLIP-39), Trezor Suite IndexedDB files and Exodus wallet configuration (passphrase.json, seed.seco).

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how ongoing (analysis of artifacts and C2 infrastructure), teams are taking away lessons such as macOS malware is evolving with modular, updateable designs that bypass traditional detection, application swapping techniques can bypass user scrutiny by replacing trusted software and detached screen sessions and LaunchAgents provide persistent, stealthy execution, and recommending next steps like verify cryptocurrency wallet application integrity (e.g., code signing, checksums) before use, monitor for unusual LaunchAgents (e.g., application.com.artificialintelligence) and detached screen sessions and audit /Applications and ~/Library/LaunchAgents for unauthorized modifications, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Users of Ledger Live, Trezor Suite, or Exodus on macOS should verify application authenticity and check for signs of tampering (e.g., unexpected Dock icons, missing original applications).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating replacing legitimate Ledger Live/Trezor Suite with counterfeit versions via mdriversinstall.sh and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating dropper downloading a shell script (mdriversinstall.sh) from a C2 server. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating mdriversinstall.sh, mdriversfiles.sh, mdriversswaps.sh scripts executed, Scheduled Task/Job: Launch Agent (T1053.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating persistence via LaunchAgent (application.com.artificialintelligence), and Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (T1564.008) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating operates stealthily using detached `screen` sessions. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent (T1543.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating persistent LaunchAgent (application.com.artificialintelligence), Create Account: Local Account (T1136.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating hidden directory (~/.mdrivers) with updateable scripts, and Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit (T1542.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating modular design allows remote updates, extending the campaign’s lifespan. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating replaces genuine wallet apps with unsigned FAT Mach-O executables. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating hidden directory (~/.mdrivers), Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating replaces genuine wallet apps with counterfeit versions registered in Dock via PlistBuddy, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (T1564.008) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating detached `screen` sessions for stealthy execution, and Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (T1027.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating unsigned FAT Mach-O executables (Swift-based). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers (T1555.005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates wallet data (Trezor’s IndexedDB, Exodus’ passphrase.json, Ledger’s app.json) and Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating keystroke logging (200–400ms debounce) to harvest recovery phrases. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating mdriversmetrics.sh conducts system reconnaissance (installed apps, processes) and Process Discovery (T1057) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating mdriversmetrics.sh collects running processes. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates wallet data (IndexedDB, passphrase.json, app.json) and Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating keystroke logging to capture recovery phrases (12–33 words). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dropper downloading scripts from C2 (hxxps such as //ovalresponsibility.com), Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltration via /track, /seed, /seed2 endpoints on C2 domains (wheelchairmoments.com), and Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding (T1132.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating modular design allows remote updates via C2. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including recovery phrases sent to /seed and /seed2 endpoints in plaintext, and user activity beacons sent to /track every 10 seconds and Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication (T1020.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating real-time exfiltration of keystrokes and recovery phrases. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating potential for mass financial loss and irreversible asset theft and Server Software Component Hijack (T1648) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating replaces genuine wallet apps with phishing versions that render fake pages. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.