Comparison Overview
LDLC Le Havre

LDLC Le Havre
86, Rue Président Wilson, Le Havre, 76600, FR
Last Update: 07/03/2026
LDLC Le Havre c'est un large choix de solutions pour les besoins en informatique des particuliers et professionnels. Création de PC sur mesure, adaptés à vos besoins spécifiques, amélioration et optimisation de votre PC portable... nous sommes là pour répondre à vos de...

Ace Hardware Corporation
2915 Jorie Blvd, Oak Brook, Illinois, US, 60523
Last Update: 29/03/2026
Ace Hardware is the largest retailer-owned hardware cooperative in the world with over 5,800 locally owned and operated hardware stores in approximately 70 countries. Headquartered in Oak Brook, Ill., Ace and its subsidiaries operate an expansive network of distributio...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

LDLC Le Havre







Ace Hardware Corporation






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for LDLC Le Havre in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ace Hardware Corporation in 2026.
Incident History - LDLC Le Havre (X = Date, Y = Severity)
LDLC Le Havre cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ace Hardware Corporation (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ace Hardware Corporation cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

LDLC Le Havre

Ace Hardware Corporation
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.