Comparison Overview
Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. (Operations - eLogistics)

Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. (Operations - eLogistics)
Brgy Pulo, Pulo Diezmo Road, Cabuyao, 4025, PH
Last Update: 01/04/2026
This page highlights Lazada Philippines (Operations) activities, initiatives and events. With every Lazadians' mindset to be the leading ecosystem providing innovative logistics solutions to enable merchants’ success and consumers’ delight, we commit to do our very bes...

DSV - Global Transport and Logistics
Hovedgaden 630, Hedehusene, DK, 2640
Last Update: 04/04/2026
At DSV, we keep supply chains flowing in a world of change. We provide and manage supply chain solutions for thousands of companies every day – from small family-run businesses to large global corporations. Our reach is global, yet our presence is local and close to our...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. (Operations - eLogistics)







DSV - Global Transport and Logistics






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. (Operations - eLogistics) in 2026.
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DSV - Global Transport and Logistics in 2026.
Incident History - Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. (Operations - eLogistics) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. (Operations - eLogistics) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - DSV - Global Transport and Logistics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DSV - Global Transport and Logistics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Lazada E-Services Philippines Inc. (Operations - eLogistics)

DSV - Global Transport and Logistics
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the construct_uri() function concatenates multiple URI components (protocol, username, domain, port, params) into a fixed 1024-byte global BSS buffer without any bounds checking. When a routing script calls construct_uri() with an attacker-controlled username, a combined component length exceeding 1024 bytes overflows the buffer, corrupting adjacent global data with attacker-controlled content. The overflow reaches disable_503_translation, a global flag controlling SIP 503 response handling, allowing an attacker to deterministically set the flag via the URI username and alter the server's routing behavior for subsequent messages. Because the same buffer is shared with contact_builder(), the overflow also corrupts that function's data, and without a memory sanitizer the adjacent globals are silently overwritten on every request containing a long username. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.
A security vulnerability has been detected in RackTables up to 0.22.0/e5fff9f8aab339798ed47e8c6d7d977ed97a82bd. This vulnerability affects unknown code. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The project maintainer confirms: "[I]t seems plausible, in that RackTables does not at this time have any CSRF prevention. You may assign a CVE ID to this, but there is no guarantee it will be handled in urgent, or even timely, manner, or at all."
A weakness has been identified in Ehco1996 django-sspanel up to 2023.12.26. This affects the function TicketDetailView of the file apps/sspanel/views.py of the component Support Ticket Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to authorization bypass. The attack can be executed remotely. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
Odysseus before commit 87babb5 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows admin-privileged attackers to direct the server to probe internal network resources by supplying arbitrary URLs to the embedding endpoint configuration without scheme, host, IP range, or DNS rebind validation. Attackers can submit loopback addresses, RFC 1918 ranges, or link-local addresses through the embedding endpoint API to partially read responses from cloud instance metadata services, internal APIs, and other hosts reachable from the server.
- https://aydinnyunus.github.io/2026/06/16/odysseus-embedding-endpoint-takeover/
- https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/commit/87babb58d57897089b133b313e2ab6d09e7ef54e
- https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/132
- https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/pull/1206
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/odysseus-ssrf-via-embedding-endpoint-configuration
Odysseus before commit bf325f6 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows authenticated non-admin users to manage server-wide embedding backend configuration by invoking endpoint management routes that verify session authentication but omit the admin authorization guard. Attackers can supply an attacker-controlled URL to overwrite the embedding backend persisted in the endpoint configuration file and process environment, causing all subsequent embedding operations including chat messages, RAG queries, memory entries, and vault text to be transmitted in plaintext to the attacker-controlled destination, or delete the endpoint configuration to deny embedding service to all users.
- https://aydinnyunus.github.io/2026/06/16/odysseus-embedding-endpoint-takeover/
- https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/commit/bf325f6b2185cb42bc5d8f5713a64aecffb766d4
- https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/132
- https://github.com/odysseus-dev/odysseus/issues/80
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/odysseus-missing-admin-authorization-via-embedding-endpoint-routes