Comparison Overview
Launch by NTT DATA

Launch by NTT DATA
N/A
Last Update: 19/03/2026
Launch by NTT DATA exists to help our clients strategize, ship, and scale provocative digital experiences that connect with your customers and drive growth. We attract dissatisfied, yet optimistic technology leaders who know they must take smart risks to create top-line...

Infinite Computer Solutions
Tower Oaks Blvd, #700, Rockville, Maryland, US, 20852
Last Update: 17/06/2026
Infinite is a global leader in technology modernization, next-gen IT services and solutions, and digital engineering, with over two decades of experience helping clients turn digital transformation into business value. Leveraging an AI-first approach, we combine leading...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Launch by NTT DATA







Infinite Computer Solutions






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Launch by NTT DATA in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
Infinite Computer Solutions has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Launch by NTT DATA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Launch by NTT DATA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Infinite Computer Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Infinite Computer Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Launch by NTT DATA

Infinite Computer Solutions
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in adafap api-mcp up to 92b9a5d04acfec165c7d4ef852496593aa87be06. This affects the function customAxios of the file app/api/proxy/route.ts of the component Proxy API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in PhialsBasement KoboldCPP-MCP-Server 1.0.0. Affected by this issue is the function makeRequest of the file src/index.ts of the component BaseConfigSchema. Executing a manipulation of the argument apiUrl can lead to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A security flaw has been discovered in Handwriting-OCR handwriting-ocr-mcp-server 0.1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function fs.readFileSync of the file src/index.ts of the component upload_document. Performing a manipulation of the argument File results in path traversal. Attacking locally is a requirement. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A vulnerability was identified in Nikolaibibo claude-comfyui-mcp 1.0.0. Affected is the function copyFileSync of the file src/tools/utils.ts of the component comfy_upload_image. Such manipulation of the argument image_path leads to path traversal. An attack has to be approached locally. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in nltk/nltk versions 3.9.4 and the current develop branch. The `nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url()` function, intended to prevent SSRF by rejecting internal network addresses, fails to reject IPs in the RFC 6598 shared address space (`100.64.0.0/10`). This occurs because Python's `ipaddress` module does not classify such addresses as `is_private` or `is_global`, and the current guard only checks `is_private` and a few explicit categories. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to NLTK's network-loading helpers can exploit this vulnerability to make a strict-mode application send requests to shared-address-space hosts, potentially exposing non-public infrastructure reachable from the application host. The impact is limited to SSRF-style confidentiality exposure, with no code execution claimed.