Comparison Overview
Lanteris Space Systems

Lanteris Space Systems
3875 Fabian Way, Palo Alto, California, US, 94303
Last Update: 27/03/2026
As an Intuitive Machines Company, Lanteris Space Systems is a company built to deliver with speed, innovation and proven success in space. With a focus on rapid design and efficient manufacturing, we help government and commercial customers meet the fast-changing demand...

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, 20591, US
Last Update: 10/09/2026
The FAA is on the leading edge of a new frontier in commercial space transportation, building the next generation (NextGen) of satellite-based navigation systems, and fostering the safe integration of unmanned aerial systems into our airspace. We can only dream of what ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Lanteris Space Systems







Federal Aviation Administration






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Lanteris Space Systems in 2026.
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Federal Aviation Administration in 2026.
Incident History - Lanteris Space Systems (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Lanteris Space Systems cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Federal Aviation Administration (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Federal Aviation Administration cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Lanteris Space Systems

Federal Aviation Administration
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.