Comparison Overview
Granite Group Benefits, An Alera Group Company (formerly Landmark Benefits)

Granite Group Benefits, An Alera Group Company (formerly Landmark Benefits)
1001 Elm Street, Suite 301, Manchester, New Hampshire, 03101, US
Last Update: 04/02/2026
As of 2024, Landmark Benefits will officially operate as part of Granite Group Benefits, an Alera Group Company. Please visit and follow the Granite Group Benefits page for legal alerts, news, office updates, upcoming webinars, and more: https://www.linkedin.com/company...

Porto
Avenida Rio Branco, 1489, Sao Paulo, SP, BR, 01205-001
Last Update: 03/09/2026
A Porto é mais que uma seguradora, é um ecossistema de soluções de serviços de proteção com tecnologia embarcada, para melhorar e facilitar a experiência do cliente. Com mais de 70 anos de mercado, a atuação da companhia se concentra hoje em quatro pilares estratégicos ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Granite Group Benefits, An Alera Group Company (formerly Landmark Benefits)







Porto






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Granite Group Benefits, An Alera Group Company (formerly Landmark Benefits) in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Porto in 2026.
Incident History - Granite Group Benefits, An Alera Group Company (formerly Landmark Benefits) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Granite Group Benefits, An Alera Group Company (formerly Landmark Benefits) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Porto (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Porto cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Granite Group Benefits, An Alera Group Company (formerly Landmark Benefits)

Porto
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.