Comparison Overview
Los Angeles County Department of Health Services

Los Angeles County Department of Health Services
313 N. Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, 90012, US
Last Update: 31/03/2026
Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (DHS; LADHS) is the 2nd largest municipal hospital system in the United States. With an annual operating budget of over $4 billion USD, DHS operates an extensive healthcare network throughout Los Angeles County, including...

Johnson & Johnson
New Brunswick, NJ, US, 08903
Last Update: 24/08/2026
At Johnson & Johnson, we believe health is everything. Our strength in healthcare innovation empowers us to build a world where complex diseases are prevented, treated, and cured, where treatments are smarter and less invasive, and solutions are personal. Through our ex...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Los Angeles County Department of Health Services







Johnson & Johnson






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Los Angeles County Department of Health Services in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
Johnson & Johnson has 94.17% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Los Angeles County Department of Health Services cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Johnson & Johnson (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Johnson & Johnson cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Los Angeles County Department of Health Services

Johnson & Johnson
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.