Comparison Overview
Laced

Laced
39 Earlham Street, London, WC2H 9LT, GB
Last Update: 27/02/2026
AUDIO SERVICES | RECORD LABEL | MUSIC PUBLISHING | CATALOGUE Laced is a full-service creative agency specialising in audio and music for video games and moving media. Our team is made up of musicians, sound designers, music producers, music supervisors and project man...

Universal Music Group
2220 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, 90401, US
Last Update: 06/09/2026
Universal Music Group (UMG) is the world leader in music-based entertainment, with a broad array of businesses engaged in recorded music, music publishing, merchandising and audiovisual content in more than 60 countries. Featuring the most comprehensive catalog of recor...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Laced







Universal Music Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Entertainment Providers Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Laced in 2026.
Incidents vs Entertainment Providers Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Universal Music Group in 2026.
Incident History - Laced (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Laced cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Universal Music Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Universal Music Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Laced

Universal Music Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.