Comparison Overview
Kuehne+Nagel

Kuehne+Nagel
Kuehne + Nagel, Schindellegi, 8834, CH
Last Update: 02/04/2026
With more than 82,000 employees at almost 1,300 sites in close to 100 countries, the Kuehne+Nagel Group is one of the world's leading logistics providers. Headquartered in Switzerland, Kuehne+Nagel is listed in the Swiss blue-chip stock market index, the SMI. The Grou...

Ecom Express Limited
Gurugram, Haryana, IN, 122002
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Ecom Express: Delivering Over 1.9 Billion Reasons to Trust Us Based in Gurugram, Ecom Express was established in 2012 by veterans backed by 100+ years of collective logistics expertise. We aren't just a logistics provider—we're your partner in bridging distances and ma...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Kuehne+Nagel







Ecom Express Limited






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kuehne+Nagel in 2026.
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ecom Express Limited in 2026.
Incident History - Kuehne+Nagel (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kuehne+Nagel cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ecom Express Limited (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ecom Express Limited cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Kuehne+Nagel

Ecom Express Limited
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.