Comparison Overview
Krüger Kaldnes AS

Krüger Kaldnes AS
Hinderveien 2, Sandefjord, Vestfold, Norway, 3223, NO
Last Update: 13/12/2025
Krüger Kaldnes leverer totale løsninger for avløpsrensing, vannbehandling, rehabilitering og service, til Kommuner og Industri i Norge. Som en del av det globale konsernet, Veolia, kan vi tilby et mangfoldig utvalg av verdensledende teknologier og produkter.

Rentokil Initial
Compass House, Manor Royal, Crawley, RH10 9PY, GB
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Rentokil Initial plc employs c.68,500 people across 89 countries - offering the experience and expertise of a multi-national organisation, whilst delivering services with the agility and characteristics of a local business. As world leaders in Pest Control and Hygiene...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Krüger Kaldnes AS







Rentokil Initial






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Krüger Kaldnes AS in 2026.
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Rentokil Initial in 2026.
Incident History - Krüger Kaldnes AS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Krüger Kaldnes AS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Rentokil Initial (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Rentokil Initial cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Krüger Kaldnes AS

Rentokil Initial
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.