Comparison Overview
Kooga Rugby Ltd

Kooga Rugby Ltd
Centenary House, Rochdale, OL11 4JG, GB
Last Update: 25/12/2025
Specializing in rugby shirts, rugby boots and other rugby kit since 1997 we have a wide range of items to improve the players game through enhancement and protection. We offer a fully bespoke kit development and production service available through www.kooga-teamwear...

DECATHLON FRANCE
4, Boulevard de Mons, Villeneuve-d'Ascq, 59650, FR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We are the world's Largest sports retailer. Founded in 1976, in France, we have set about making the pleasure and benefit of sports available for everyone across the globe. We do that by providing world class products at extremely affordable prices for all participants,...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Kooga Rugby Ltd







DECATHLON FRANCE






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Sporting Goods Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kooga Rugby Ltd in 2026.
Incidents vs Sporting Goods Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DECATHLON FRANCE in 2026.
Incident History - Kooga Rugby Ltd (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kooga Rugby Ltd cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - DECATHLON FRANCE (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DECATHLON FRANCE cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Kooga Rugby Ltd

DECATHLON FRANCE
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.