Comparison Overview
Kelley Blue Book

Kelley Blue Book
195 Technology Drive, Irvine, 92618, US
Last Update: 09/03/2026
Founded in 1926, Kelley Blue Book, The Trusted Resource®, is the vehicle valuation and information source trusted and relied upon by both consumers and the automotive industry. Each week the company provides market-reflective values on its top-rated website KBB.com, inc...

BYD
No.3009, BYD Road, Pingshan, Shenzhen, Guangdong, CN, 518118
Last Update: 07/10/2026
Established in 1995, BYD is a top high-tech enterprise in China specializing in IT, automobile, and new energy.BYD is the largest supplier of rechargeable batteries in the globe, and has the largest market share for Nickel-cadmium batteries, handset Li-ion batteries, ce...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Kelley Blue Book







BYD






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kelley Blue Book in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
BYD has 0.99% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Kelley Blue Book (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kelley Blue Book cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - BYD (X = Date, Y = Severity)
BYD cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Kelley Blue Book

BYD
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.