Comparison Overview
KDC Inc.

KDC Inc.
4462 Corporate Center Drive, Los Alamitos, 90720, US
Last Update: 29/03/2026
KDC Inc. has developed many strong relationships with general contractors, architects and engineers in Southern California. Our skill, experience, purchasing power, and access to technical and financial resources enable us to complete your project in a timely manner wit...

ALEC Holdings
Marina Walk, 3601 - Marina Plaza, Dubai Marina, Dubai, U.A.E., Dubai, Dubai, AE, PO Box 27639
Last Update: 20/09/2026
ALEC Holdings, part of the Investment Corporate of Dubai (ICD), is a leading construction and related businesses group operating in the UAE and KSA. The company builds and provides construction solutions that set industry benchmarks for quality, safety, functionality, a...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

KDC Inc.







ALEC Holdings






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for KDC Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ALEC Holdings in 2026.
Incident History - KDC Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
KDC Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ALEC Holdings (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ALEC Holdings cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

KDC Inc.

ALEC Holdings
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.