Comparison Overview
Kazakhtelecom JSC

Kazakhtelecom JSC
район Есиль, ул. Сауран 12, Нур-Султан, 010000 , KZ
Last Update: 01/04/2026
JSC «Kazakhtelecom», the national carrier of Kazakhstan and one of the fastest growing telecommunications companies in the former Soviet Union, provides a broad spectrum of infocomm services. The central office is located in the capital of Kazakhstan - Astana. The com...

TELUS
510 West Georgia St., Vancouver, British Columbia, CA, V6B 0M3
Last Update: 23/06/2026
At TELUS, our purpose-driven team works together every day to innovate and do good. From providing technology solutions that make our lives safer and easier, to supporting those who need it most, our inclusive, spirited and giving people are passionate about empowering ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Kazakhtelecom JSC







TELUS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kazakhtelecom JSC in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
TELUS has 371.7% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Kazakhtelecom JSC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kazakhtelecom JSC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - TELUS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TELUS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Kazakhtelecom JSC

TELUS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.