Comparison Overview
KAI

KAI
ul. Slavyanska 5, Sofia, 1000, BG
Last Update: 23/04/2026
KAI is one of the biggest producers of ceramic tiles, glazed and unglazed porcelain tiles on the Balkan Peninsula. The Group was incorporated in 1997 and unites the plants Khan Asparuh – Isperih and Khan Omurtag – Shumen. KAI is member of Mohawk Industries holding. The...

Knauf
Am Bahnhof 7, Iphofen, D-97346, DE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Everyone sees opportunity differently. Knauf sees opportunity in everyone. Similar to other global businesses, our 41,500 team members in 90 countries across 300 sites provide a huge opportunity for anyone with ambition and energy. Unlike other global businesses, you ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

KAI







Knauf






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for KAI in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Knauf in 2026.
Incident History - KAI (X = Date, Y = Severity)
KAI cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Knauf (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Knauf cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

KAI

Knauf
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.