Comparison Overview
KAEFER in Qatar

KAEFER in Qatar
Street No.211 Zone No. 74 , Al Khor, 22147, QA
Last Update: 18/02/2026
In 1993, KAEFER started its operation in the Middle East and opened the first office in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirate. With strong leadership and highly motivated team, new markets were developed and offices were established in Qatar, Iran, Kingdom of...

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
900 7th Street, NW, Washington, 20001, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
The IBEW represents 860,000 active. and retired who work in a wide variety of fields, including utilities, construction, telecommunications, broadcasting, manufacturing, railroads and government. The IBEW has members in both the United States and Canada and stands out ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

KAEFER in Qatar







International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for KAEFER in Qatar in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) in 2026.
Incident History - KAEFER in Qatar (X = Date, Y = Severity)
KAEFER in Qatar cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

KAEFER in Qatar

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.