Comparison Overview
Kadlec

Kadlec
888 Swift Blvd., Richland, 99352, US
Last Update: 21/01/2026
Kadlec is an integrated regional health care system with a rich history of providing the highest quality care. Kadlec opened its doors in 1944 as a hospital to care for the Hanford area workers and their families and is now the second largest employer in the Tri-Cities ...

Intermountain Health
5245 South College Drive, Murray , UT, US, 84123
Last Update: 04/09/2026
Headquartered in Utah with locations in six primary states and additional operations across the western U.S., Intermountain Health is a nonprofit system of 34 hospitals, 400+ clinics, a medical group of more than 4,800 employed physicians and advanced care providers, a ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Kadlec







Intermountain Health






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kadlec in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Intermountain Health in 2026.
Incident History - Kadlec (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kadlec cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Intermountain Health (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Intermountain Health cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Kadlec

Intermountain Health
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.