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Analyze » Johnson & Johnson » JOHROLERI1772202424

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (JOHROLERI1772202424)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-26
Company Score Before Incident798 / 1000
Company Score After Incident772 / 1000
Company LinkView Johnson & Johnson Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERJOHROLERI1772202424
Type of Cyber IncidentBreach
ATTACK VECTORStolen employee credentials via infostealer malware
DATA EXPOSEDEmployee credentials, potential access to...
INCIDENT DATE22/02/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Johnson & Johnson's Breach and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Johnson & Johnson Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Johnson & Johnson breach identified under incident ID JOHROLERI1772202424.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Johnson & Johnson's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/johnson-&-johnson, the number of followers: 10025600, the industry type: Hospitals and Health Care and the number of employees: 118425 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 798 and after the incident was 772 with a difference of -26 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Johnson & Johnson and their customers.

On 23 February 2026, Rolls-Royce disclosed Credential Stuffing issues under the banner "Credential Stuffing Campaign Exploits Stolen Employee Logins to Breach Corporate Networks".

A sophisticated credential stuffing campaign targeting corporate Single Sign-On (SSO) gateways, particularly F5 BIG-IP interfaces, leveraged stolen employee credentials harvested from infostealer malware infections to gain network access.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting ADFS, Security Token Services (STS) and OWA portals, and exposing Employee credentials, potential access to internal systems, with nearly 70 unique credentials records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The incident underscores the critical importance of multi-factor authentication (MFA) and the risks posed by infostealer malware in enabling credential stuffing attacks. Identity is now the new perimeter, and stolen credentials can bypass traditional security measures, and recommending next steps like Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all corporate systems, especially SSO and remote access gateways, Monitor for infostealer malware infections on employee devices and Enforce strict password policies and regular credential rotation.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating 77% of the 70 unique credentials matched known infostealer infection logs, Brute Force: Credential Stuffing (T1110.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating credential stuffing campaign targeting corporate SSO gateways, and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating targeted ADFS, STS, OWA portals, and F5 BIG-IP interfaces. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating credentials harvested from infostealer malware infections on employee devices and OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware logs used to extract credentials. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating automated login attempts using stolen credentials. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating access to VPNs, SSO portals, or remote access gateways and Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen ADFS passwords used to unlock internal systems. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating bypass traditional security measures using stolen credentials and Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating compromised Fortinet FortiGate-60E with self-signed SSL certificate. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating potential data exfiltration via network intrusion. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy (T1090) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating traffic routed through hijacked network devices (Fortinet FortiGate-60E). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Sources & References