Comparison Overview
Johnson & Johnson MedTech

Johnson & Johnson MedTech
1 Johnson and Johnson Plaza, New Brunswick, New Jersey, US, 08901
Last Update: 01/04/2026
At Johnson & Johnson MedTech, we are working to solve the world’s most pressing healthcare challenges through innovations at the intersection of biology and technology. With deep expertise in surgery, orthopaedics, cardiovascular, and vision, we design healthcare soluti...

Nova Scotia Health Authority
1276 South Park Street, Halifax, B3H 2Y9, CA
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We are Nova Scotia Health. We are rural and urban. We are in hospitals, health centres and community. We serve individuals and communities from Yarmouth to Cape Breton, from Amherst to Halifax, and everything in between. We are researchers and learners, looking for new...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Johnson & Johnson MedTech







Nova Scotia Health Authority






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Johnson & Johnson MedTech in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Nova Scotia Health Authority in 2026.
Incident History - Johnson & Johnson MedTech (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Johnson & Johnson MedTech cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Nova Scotia Health Authority (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Nova Scotia Health Authority cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Johnson & Johnson MedTech

Nova Scotia Health Authority
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.