Comparison Overview
JLL UK

JLL UK
30 Warwick Street, London, W1B 5NH, GB
Last Update: 14/02/2026
JLL UK, a leading professional services firm specialising in real estate and investment management. We take pride in choosing the more intelligent, optimistic, and collaborative way forward. With over 200 years of real estate experience, we are,and always have been, in ...

International Workplace Group plc
Dammstrasse 19, Zug, Switzerland, CH, CH-6300
Last Update: 16/09/2026
IWG: the world’s leading platform for work, revolutionising how and where people work IWG (International Workplace Group) is the global leader in hybrid and platform working. With 4,000+ locations across 120 countries and millions of customers worldwide, IWG empowers bu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

JLL UK







International Workplace Group plc






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for JLL UK in 2026.
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for International Workplace Group plc in 2026.
Incident History - JLL UK (X = Date, Y = Severity)
JLL UK cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - International Workplace Group plc (X = Date, Y = Severity)
International Workplace Group plc cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

JLL UK

International Workplace Group plc
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.