Comparison Overview
JetBrains Channel Partners

JetBrains Channel Partners
Na Hřebenech II 1718/8. Praha 4 - Nusle, Praha, 140 00, CZ
Last Update: 16/05/2026
JetBrains focuses on building a strong community, working together with more than 140 resellers and numerous partners around the world. These partners help us reach and assist customers in more territories and industries than we would ever be able to cover ourselves. Ou...

Xiaomi Technology
No. 33 Xi erqi Middle Road, Haidian District, Beijing,100085,China, Beijing, CN
Last Update: 26/06/2026
Xiaomi Corporation was founded in April 2010 and listed on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on July 9, 2018 (1810.HK). Xiaomi is a consumer electronics and smart manufacturing company with smartphones and smart hardware connected by an IoT platform at its ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

JetBrains Channel Partners







Xiaomi Technology






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for JetBrains Channel Partners in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
Xiaomi Technology has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - JetBrains Channel Partners (X = Date, Y = Severity)
JetBrains Channel Partners cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Xiaomi Technology (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Xiaomi Technology cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

JetBrains Channel Partners

Xiaomi Technology
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.